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Deleuze and Human Rights: The Optimism and Pessimism of 
ǯ68 






The paper takes as its point of departure the claim of Alain Badiou that the events of 1968 have two 
possible outcomes, ǲone pessimisticǳ and one ǲoptimisticǳ (2015: 43-44). It suggests that one of the main 
manifestations of the pessimistic outcome is the triumph of human rights thought as a form of the only true 
measure of morality, a new transcendent subject. On the other hand, it suggests that one of the optimistic 
outcomes of 1968 is the political turn that the philosophical thought of Gilles Deleuze took as a result of the 
events of '68. The paper brings together these two oppositional manifestations of '68 by exploring and 
critically examining the critique of human rights of Deleuze. In particular, it focuses on his claim that rights 
are a new form of "transcendence." As such, the paper explores ǯ critical comments on the notion 
of transcendence and his preference for an immanent mode of thought, and it tries to connect this with his 
critique of rights, through the distinction he makes between ethics and morality. The paper argues that 







This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of commemorating the events of 1968, but 
what exactly are we commemorating? In better terms what are the legacies of 1968? If, 
according to Julian Bourg, that which ǲwe often celebrate [about 1968] is a fundamental 
sense of possibilityǳ (2017: xii), then we have to askǢ ǲhow has this possibility (or 
possibilities) been, or may still be, actualised?ǳ A potential answer to such a question was 
given by Alain Badiou who suggests that there are two possible outcomes of the events 
of 1968. The first is an outright ǲpessimistic oneǳ (2015: 43). The revolutionary spirit of 
1968 is dead and ǡ  ǲ-ǳ of conservative forces of reaction 
(Douzinas 2017: 148) have prevailed and, what Gilles Châtelet calls, the ǲ(Neo)Liberal 
Counter-Reformationǳ is the outright victor of the post-1968 political and social milieu 
(2014: 3, 145). ǯfatalistic politics are dictating every step of each 
singular life and ǲǳ of 1968, despite not fulfilling their dream 
of changing the world, efficiently managed to conquer ǲthe heights of power in public and 
private sectors, in political parties and the mediaǳ (Douzinas 2017: 148), often becoming 
the very thing that they hoped to overthrow fifty years ago. 
In this paper, we suggest that the triumph  ǲ-ǳ of human rights 
constitutes one of the central maniǲǳ outcome of the events 
of 1968. In the post-1968 world human rights discourse(s) came to substitute most of the 
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calls for a ǲreal social revolutionǳ (Ishay 2008: 248-249; see also Douzinas 2017: 148; 
Bourg 2017: xvi) by speaking and presenting their claims in a post-political language, 
beyond ideologies, preferring a so-called ǲmoralǳ approach over a political one in 
dictating international affairs, legal and social norms and demands. Indeed, the often  ǲ-ideǳ           ǲǳ          ǡ ǡ
ideological, national backgrounds or/and beliefs and class status (Douzinas 2000: 1-2). ǲǳǲǳǲconsensusǳ 
(Deleuze, 1995: 152) which suggests that the dominant position of human rights in our            ǲǡǳ   so-called 
fulfilment of the Enlightenment Project as a (post)modern form of the Kantian jus 
cosmopoliticum (Douzinas 2007: 4). 
However, it became apparent very soon that these dreams were not about to turn into 
reality. Human rights and their values look like they are unable to address the numerous 
situations of suffering, violence around the world, the crises that we face today, e.g., the 
refugee and financial crises, ǯmarginalised. In addition, 
we cannot overlook the crucial fact that human rights narratives are often, explicitly, 
utilised to serve, arguably, neo-imperial and neoliberal purposes (Hardt & Negri 2000: 
17-18). Indeed, the consensus that human rights discourse(s) managed to achieve 
through their, very effective, use of post-ideological, even a-ǡǲǳǲa measureǳ (Motha & Zartaloudis 2003: 243) that 
decides what is morally good, or evil. Hence, it is not surprising that the inauguration of 
the so-called ǲhuman rights warsǳ during the 1990s (Virilio 2007: 49) was endorsed by 
many people, from different backgrounds, as a just cause against evil. These have led to 
the emergence of multiple critiques of rightsǯ impotence or even neo-imperial character, 
be that political, religious, cultural, philosophical or anthropological. Nonetheless, the 
hegemonic position of rights does not seem to have lost significant ground, making us 
wonder whether they are truly the last Ȃ not so ideal Ȃ utopia (Moyn 2010). Instead, what            ǲǳ ǲǳ, (Badiou 2012: 4) ǲǳǲǳ lost in their nostalgia for 
older times. 
Returning to the issue of the legacies of 1968, in his work mentioned above, Badiou 
also speaks of an ǲoptimisticǳ outcome of the events (2015: 44). The new singularities 
and subjectivities that emerged during the events of 1968 point towards the promise of 
a radical change, the dawn of new movements, a new image of thought for doing politics, 
for thinking about aesthetics and ethics. It is within this framework that the philosophical 
thought of one of the most significant French philosophers of the twentieth century, the 
late Gilles Deleuze Ȃ and after his fateful encounter with the militant psychoanalyst Félix 
Guattari Ȃ shifted towards a more politically oriented style and engagement. ǯ
influence on a variety of disciplines, not only within the humanities or social sciences, 
with an abundance of works discussing his thought and concepts, is well-documented. 
Nevertheless, his brief, yet ferocious criticism of human rights remains significantly 
under-examined with very few exceptions (see Lefebvre 2012 and Patton 2012). 
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In what follows, we aim to bring together these two manifestations of the opposite 
outcomes of the events of 1968 (the pessimistic and the optimistic one). More specifically, 
we delve into and critically explore the critique of human rights presented by Gilles 
Deleuze. Our hypothesis is that such an exploration has the potential to open up new 
possibilities of (re)thinking about ethics or about different ethics, either within a human 
rights framework or beyond the notion of rights as such. The focus of our examination 
lies on a particular critical comment made by Deleuze, suggesting that human rights are ǲestablishing new forms of transcendence, new universalsǳ (1995:  ? ? ?ȌǤ ǯ
philosophical corpus can be characterised as a polemic against the notion of 
transcendence as opposed to his preference for an immanent philosophical mode of 
thought. ǡǯ
comments about rights (Section I). Subsequently, we illustrate a brief exploration of the ǲǳǲǳǡ
we elaborate on Deleuze's critique of transcendence and his preference for immanence 
(Section II). Finally, ǯ
and his preference for immanence and his criticism of human rights, with a focus on the 
distinction made by the philosopher between morality and ethics (Section III). 
 
 
I. Attacking human rights Ȃ ǯ±±, other interviews and What is Philosophy?. 
 ǯ            
handful of interviews, with the only exception being some pages in his last collaboration 
with Guattari, What is Philosophy? Yet, as it was mentioned earlier, these brief comments 
are, usually, made in an excessively polemical tone, with the philosopher using strong 
words that show at first sight a peculiarly fierce contempt. Especially when, in section G 
comme Gauche of ǯ±±
ǡa series of video recorded interviews 
with Claire Parnet, were Deleuze comments each time on a word on the basis of a letter 
of the alphabet. At some point during this section of the interview, while they discuss the 
issue of actual revolution      ǲ-ǡǳ 
Parnǲǳ [ǯǡǲǳ] and she 
states the following: ǲǮǯǡ
days, but it is not becoming-revolutionary, quite the opposite(?)ǳ (2011). When Deleuze 
is asked to express his view on the above statement/question his body-language shows 
signs of discomfort and even exasperation. His instant response is vehemently vitriolic, 
stating the following: 
 
Listen, this respect for the Ǯrights of manǯ Ȃ this really makes me want to say, almost 
make some odious statements. It belongs so much to the weak thinking of the empty 
intellectual period that we discussed earlier [here he refers to his view that culture 
is in a state of decadence, as expressed in section C comme CultureȐǤ ǯ 
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abstract these Ǯrights of manǯ.   ǫ ǯ ly abstract, completely empty. 
(2011) 
 
As Alexandre Lefebvre notes, the particular section of the interview ǲhas an ǯǤȏȐs, pauses, starts and ȏǥȐǳ (2012: 49). This is remarkable if we are to take into account the striking change 
of mood that characterises this part form the rest of the eight-hours long interview. For 
the majority of the time, Deleuze is distinctly calm, sometimes replying in a serious tone 
and at other times in a more cheerful manner. As John Marks remarks in his commentary 
on ǯ±±, ǲit is striking that Deleuze switches rapidly from moments of humour Ȃ 
ideas seem to suddenly strike him as humorous and he breaks out into a grin full of 
complicity, spluttering with laughter Ȃ  Ǯ ?  ǳ (1998: 11). 
However, what are more precisely the main issues that he identifies as problematic with 
regard to human rights? 
In ǯ±± (2011) ǲǳ (1995) interviews, but also in What 
is Philosophy? (1994), Deleuze Ȃ and in the last instance together with Guattari Ȃ refers to 
human rights as ǲuniversalsǳ and ǲaxiomsǳ that in a very hypocritical manner ǲclaim to 
restore the society of friends, or even wise men, by forming a universal opinion as Ǯconsensusǯable to moralize nations, the State, and the marketǳ (1994: 107). In reality, 
however, human rights are mere ǲempty abstractions that belong to the weak thought of 
imbeciles [débiles]ǳ (2011). Human rights, and, in particular, their declarations, as 
Deleuze states, ǲare never made as a function of the people who are directly concernedǳ 
(2011) and thus, not only do they usually neglect the people they are supposed to protect 
and give a voice to, but they are also accomplices to the  ǯ  Ǥ  ǡ       ǲ ǳ
according to the wishes of global capitalism, without taking into account the needs of the 
so-called subject of their protection (Deleuze, 1995: 172-173). In order to illustrate this 
view, further, Deleuze refers, in ǯ±±, to the example of the Armenians, which 
manifests the abstraction of universal human rights and their detachment from real-life 
cases brilliantly: 
 
There is an enclave, an Armenian enclave in another Soviet republic and there is an  
Armenian republic. So that's the first aspect of the situation. There is this massacre 
by some sort of Turkic ȏǥȐǤ This massacre of Armenians, in the enclave. So from 
the enclave, the Armenians retreat into their republic, I guess Ȃ please correct me if I 
am wrong Ȃ and then, there is an earthquake. You'd think you were in something 
written by Marquis de Sade, these poor people go through the worst ordeals inflicted 
by men, and when they reach shelter, it's nature that gets involved. When people say Ǯthe rights of manǯ it's just intellectual discourse, for odious intellectuals. For 
intellectuals who have no ideas. First I have always noticed that these declarations 
are never made as a function of the people who are directly concerned, the Armenian 
society, the Armenian communities, etc. Their problem is not Ǯthe rights of manǯ. 
(2011) 
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Using the above case, Deleuze succeeds in succinctly expressing a concrete example 
that manifests, in all its reality, the predicaments and actual catastrophes that the 
Armenian people were enduring. As stated by Alexandre Lefebvre, ǲthe Armenian 
example is obviously an instance of the intolerableǳ (2008: 84). It is also a perplexing and 
quite unique case that ǲposes a singular problem to law: how to make this situation 
liveableǳ (2008: 84)? This is precisely the question that Deleuze wants to ask human 
rights to address, because for him a successful account of human rights Ȃ if such a thing 
exists at all Ȃ should treat all the unique cases in their specificity, try to find innovative 
solutions that reflect and express the particular issue that they are faced with. 
Nonetheless, what happens is quite the opposite. Human rights thought is so deeply ǲǳ, which are deeply detached from real life, 
that they completely overlook the specificities of each and different case. Hence, what 
usually happens is that needs of particular people in a very specific situation are 
compromised according to the norms of static values that come "from above," and they 
are entirely separated from the concrete needs of life. Ultimately, rights are reduced to 
empty universals that form a consensus which, in its turn, turns concrete and unique 
singularities into mere abstractions. 
At this point, some people may, rightly, object that Deleuze does not offer something 
unique in his critique of rights. Indeed, many thinkers, from different political 
backgrounds have, previously, attacked the emptiness and abstraction of rights (see 
Burke 1987; Marx 1978ȌǤǡǯ critique of rights quite unique 
is his reference to the problem of ǲǳ as opposed to his preference for an ǲǳ philosophy and how transcendence relates to, what he conceives to be, the 
problem with the thought and tradition that dominate human rights. Consequently, ǯǡǡ
in our view should be incorporated within his wider critique of transcendence, as the 
term unfolds in the section below. As Deleuze states, human rights are perceived as ǲeternal valuesǳ, and as such, they reintroduce and establish ǲnew forms of 
transcendenceǳ (1995: 153). This view echoes the Nietzschean reading of Deleuze and 
his Ȃ through the medium of Nietzsche's thought Ȃ understanding of morality as 
transcendent, which dictates and shapes our way of life through its eternal values, but in 
reality, these values hide an insidious ǲhatred for lifeǳ and everything that affirms it 
(2008: 122). As Deleuze states: 
 
They [moral, eternal values] are not created by acting but by holding back from 
acting, not by affirming, but by beginning with denial. This is why they are called un-
created, divine, transcendent, superior to life. But think of what these values hide, of 
their mode of creation. They hide an extraordinary hatred, a hatred for life, a hatred 
for all that is active and affirmative in life. (2008: 122) 
 
In the same manner and as a result, Deleuze and Guattari suggest enigmatically at first 
sight perhaps: ǲhuman rights [forming the new (post)modern eternal values of our age] 
say nothing about the immanent modes of existenceǳ (1994: 107). 
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II. Immanence and Transcendence: A brief examination 
 
Both terms, immanence and transcendence, have a long and particular history within 
the philosophical and theological Western tradition, and they are known to manifest, 
depending on how they are defined, differentiated metaphysics; and as it is argued below 
different ethics too.1 We conceive the terms as two manifestations of ǲ,ǳ 
i.e., of how we ethically or morally relate to or in the world, to ourselves, etc. and as such, 
these two different understandings of relations lead to distinct, even extremely 
oppositional, philosophical modes of thinking. To that extent, when we talk about 
relations of transcendence, we, often refer to ǲrelations to somethingǳ (Williams 2010: 
128). Here the to signifies a relation towards something which can be conceived as 
external, or ǲother-worldlyǳ. Transcendence has taken many forms in, predominantly, 
philosophical and theological ways and schools of thought, such as ǲGod (at least a certain 
conception of God), the Cogito, transcendental consciousness Ȃ whether Kantian or 
phenomenological  Ȃ  the Other, the lived body and existence, all perpetuat[ing] the idea 
of a world essentially immanent, or given to some ontologically distinct principle or 
originǳ (De Beistegui 2010: 24-25) even, regarding what we can call ǲthe authority of the  ǳ, constituting a form of a transcendent entity, in the sense that it is   ǲeternalǳ, ǲǳ  ǲ-givenǳ. Such a subject understands the world 
outside of herself as something completely external Ȃ ǲthe other-worldlyǳ Ȃ as we 
referred to above (Colebrook 2002: xxix). 
The theological manifestation of the term has dominated, and still dominates, an 
abundance of religious cultures, be they monotheistic, polytheistic and from both the 
Western and the Eastern religions. While a detailed examination of theological 
transcendence is far outside of the scope of this paper, we, nonetheless, consider it 
paramount to give some useful examples, in order to better understand the role that the 
term plays in the Deleuzian corpus. We focus, then, on one of the most conventional 
manifestations of the term, that is the one found in Scholastic thought and, in particular, 
the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
In its aforementioned manifestation, a transcendent Being often characterised as God, 
is that whicǲ-ǳ, either above, beyond or outside 
of the physical world. The infinite Being and the finite creatures are characterised, 
according to the Scholastic thought, by a relation of analogia entis, which suggests that 
Being ǲs not being said of God and finite creatures in the same wayǳ (Agamben 1999: 
226). This relationship of analogy between God, the Creator, and His finite creatures, 
                                                      
1 It should be noted here that Deleuze never made explicit his intention ǲǳ 
within his corpus. Nevertheless, as Michel Foucault writes in his preface of Anti-Oedipus: ǲI would say 
that Anti-Oedipus (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written 
in France in quite a long time (perhaps that explains why its success was not limited to a particular Ǯǯǣ  -oedipal has become a lifestyle, a way of thinking and livingǳ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2013: xli). 
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according to Aquinas, starts by the fact that the being of the creatures is only received by 
virtue of the primary Being, that is God. As he writes: 
 
The creator and creature are reduced to one, not by a community of univocation, but 
of analogy. This is of two kinds. Either it arises from this that things share in 
something in greater or lesser degrees, as potency and act Ȃ and substance and 
accident Ȃ share the notion of being. Or it arises from this that one thing receives its 
being and definition from another, and such is the analogy of creature to the creator: 
the creature exists only to the degree that it descends from the primary being, and it 
is called being only because it imitates the first being. Thus it is with wisdom and all 
the other things which are said of the creature. (Aquinas 1997: Prol., q.1, art.2, ad. 2) 
 
As such, the creatures exist only by virtue of God, and they are called beings merely 
because they imitate the aforementioned first Being. As a consequence, the being and the 
qualities of the finite creatures do not manifest the same meaning as the ones said for the 
Creator. HencǡǡǲǳǲGod is goodǳ, 
the goodness of the human to that of God is merely analogous but at the same time 
distinct. Hence, ǲGod is independent of His creation, yet the creation must be referred to 
ȏǥȐǳ (Williams 2010: 128). The ultimate result is then that in such terms we have a 
kind of negative notion, where the transcendent Being, negates the finite and relative. Or 
in other words, the beings of the lower realm, find their meaning only in relation to the 
Being, belonging to the other-world.  
Within the modern philosophical tradition, with a possible starting point the thought 
of Immanuel Kant, the term of transcendence is also used to signify that which lies beyond 
our experiences, that which can be an object of our knowledge or for the     ǲǳ  Ǥ  ǡǲǳǡ
make a distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental. 
 
Transcendence, or the transcendent, is what we experience as outside of 
consciousness or experience. We experience the real world as transcendent as other 
than us or as external. A transcendental philosophy or method asks how 
transcendence is possible. For example, I can only have a real or outside world if I 
make some distinction between what appears to me (perceptions and appearances) 
and a world that appears (the perceived or appearing thing). Both Kant and Husserl 
argued that before there could be the transcendǮoutside of meǯ, 
there had to be some concept of Ǯmeǯ (or the subject) from which the real world was 
distinguished. (2002: xxix) 
 
Hence, while modernity may signify the end of the  ǯ -
philosophical thought and the unquestionable devotion to a transcendent Being in the ǲ
ǳ, the spirit of transcendence survived within modern philosophical thought. 
As we have seen in the previous section, modernity and modern philosophical thought 
may have "killed God", but the       ǲǳ Ȃ that is the 
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ontological primacy and self-evidence of the origins of a being Ȃ in that case of the subject. 
As the nineteenth-century German philosopher Max Stirner notes, with the passage from ǲthe ancientsǳ to the ǲmodernsǳ, as he calls them, we have merely a substitution of the 
notion of tǲǳ or the subject ǲ
ǳ: 
 
Therefore, by changing the predicate into the subject, the Christian essence (and 
indeed, the predicate contains the essence) is only more oppressively fixed. God and 
the divine would thus entwine themselves more inextricably with me. To expel God 
from his heaven and rob him of his Ǯtranscendenceǯ cannot yet establish a claim to 
complete victory if with this it is only chased into the human breast and endowed 
with indelible Ǯimmanenceǯ. Now it is said: The divine is truly human! (2017: 66) 
 
 On the other hand, and as opposed to the relations of transcendence discussed above, 
a concept of immanence is, usually, used to signify ǲrelations in somethingǳ (Williams 
2010: 128). In his extensive work on the issue of immanence in Deleuze and philosophy, 
in general, Christian Kerslake suggests that a preliminary definition of immanence can be 
derived from ǲtwo features Ȃ one formal, the other ontologicalǳ (2009: 2). He continues 
by stating that, 
 
formally, a philosophy of immanence is a philosophy that does not appeal to anything 
outside the terms and relations constructed by that philosophy. Ontologically, a 
philosophy of immanence promises that thought is capable of being fully expressive 
of beingǢǮǯ. (2009: 2) 
 
Hence, starting again with the theological notion, such a conception of immanence, in 
contrast to a transcendent one, would support that God can be grasped as a divine spirit, 
which infuses the physical world and thus a theological account of immanence ǲwould 
deny a God that [is] transcendent to natureǳ (Kerslake 2009: 42). To the same extent, 
philosophies of immanence Ȃ ǯ Ȃ suggest 
that there is not an external cause of the world, but everything is in God or Nature (Deus 
sive Natura) (Spinoza 1992: 29). In other words, everything ǲremains internal or remains 
withinǳ (Widder 2010: 687). 
Deleuze thinks an immanent philosophy or a philosophy of immanence, strongly 
influenced by Spinoza and John ǯǲunivocity of beingǳ,2 as well  ǯ ǲEternal Returnǳ.3 His position is that western thought, since Plato, has 
                                                      
2 John Duns Scotusǯ univocity of being opposes the equivocity of Thomistic thought, discussed above, in 
the sense that qualities such as ǲgoodness, oneness, and truthǳ are ǲindifferent to the difference between 
finite and infinite beingǳ and thus they pertain to being as such (Widder 2009: 35-36) Hence, for Scotus 
goodness signifies the same for man (finite being) and God (infinite Being). Deleuze expands the concept 
of univocity in order to suggest that no being or event or phenomenon holds more reality than any other. 
3 Deleuze reads Nietzsche's Eternal Return as the ǲaffirmative being of becomingǳ which is the ǲself-
affirming of becoming-activeǳ (2008: 72). What he means in that sense, is that the principle of Eternal 
Return is that which affirms difference, without any prior ground, and as such any form of 
transcendence. This Eternal Return is not the return of the same but rather a process of ǲbecomingǳ. As 
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been    ǲǳ  ǲǳ of transcendence. The introduction of 
transcendence, he states, is ǲthe poisoned gift of Platonismǳ (1998: 137). Platonism gave 
a ǲphilosophical meaning to transcendence (triumph of the judgment of God)ǳ (Deleuze 
1998: 137). This happenedǡ  ǯ ǡ with the introduction of the 
Platonic Idea. For Plato, the world of Ideas is a non-material but substantial realm which 
manifests the most accurate form of reality. Hence, an Idea can be said to be the essence 
of the beings we encounter in the material world. However, all the material beings are ǲǳ of the real Ideas (Plato 2012: 463-468). As a consequence, a hierarchy of 
beings is ǡ     ǲ ǳ than others. In this vertical 
mode of thought, then, the Platonic Idea is  ǲ-ǳ. 
Since they come first in the hierarchy Ȃ they represent the most adequate reality Ȃ Ideas 
are used as a measure in order to determine which things possess the quality second-
hand and so forth, in other words, which things possess more reality than others (Deleuze 
1998: 136). As a result, we ǲǳ, the universal, objective and 
transcendent principle, in its different manifestations, be it God, judgment, morality, the 
state and so forth (Deleuze 2007: 266). The One, being the measure, dictates which 
creatureǲǳǲǳ, according to their proximity to the transcendent, 
higher Being, and thus a hierarchical and vertical mode of thought is in operation Ȃ the ǲarborescentǳ way of thinking as Deleuze and Guattari call it (2015: 19). Since then, as we 
have mentioned above and according to Deleuze, ǲphilosophy cannot be liberated by 
transcendence, from Desǯ Cogito to the personal form of an Ǯǯ  ǯ
phenomenologyǳ (2005: 32-33), because ǲphilosophers were thinking about the 
transcendental as a field of consciousnessǳ (Agamben 1999: 225). Thus, philosophers are ǲemployeesǳ of this transcendent ǲstate philosophyǳ (Deleuze & Guattari 2015: 19).4 
What Deleuze, in his writings with Guattari, means by state philosophy is not something 
which is reduced to w       ǲǳ state apparatus with its 
most obvious institutional bodies (the government, police, military, etc.). Instead, the 
                                                      
Nathan Widder points out: ǲAffirmation of oneself comes through the dissolution of the self's idea of 
itself as a unified subject, without the promise of some later reconciliation or recognitionǳ (2012: 87). 
Hence, here the Nietzschean Eternal Return points towards an immanent affirmation of difference, 
which dissolves the illusions of transcendence and of higher unities and ends.  
4 Brian Massumi, in his introduction in the A Thousand Plateaus, suggests that: ǲThe established order, of 
course: philosophers have traditionally been employees of the State. The collusion between philosophy 
and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the 
foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model of higher learning throughout 
Europe and in the United States. The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals 	ȌǮ of the nationǯ, to be achieved by ǮǯȋȌǡǮǯȋȌǡǮǯȋȌǤǮǯȂ each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally 
unified in the supermind of the State. More insidious than the well-known practical cooperation 
between university and government (the burgeoning military funding of research) is its philosophical ǡǮǯduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabricǳ(in Deleuze and Guattari 
2015: ix-x) 
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phrase is closely linked to the idea of transcendence in general, as something which 
thinks in terms of hierarchy and verticality, with its judgments being based on moral and 
eternal values (such as human rights). In that sense, philosophers, by failing to escape 
and by sustaining these "illusions" of transcendence into thought, act, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, (in)directly as functionaries and employees of this mode of thought, which the ǲǳ. ǡǯ immanence is, as he supports, ǲthe only way to escape Platonismǳ (1998: 137). In his account of a philosophy of 
immanence, the One or Being is "univocal", and as such, it is characterised by a certain ǤǲEvery entity is equally being, in the sense that each actualizes its powers in the 
immediate vicinity with the first cause. The distant cause is no more: rocks, flowers, 
animals, and humans equally celebrate the glory of God in a kind of sovereign an-archyǳ 
(Deleuze 2007: 266). ǡǯ-hierarchical one, which refuses static 
moral codes, instead it aims to a constant creative mode of thought, where everything is 
connected, yet, every different part's heterogeneity is not repressed under the authority 
of the One, but it is rather equally celebr    ǲ-archic ǳ Ȃ 
ǯcal formula ǲPLURALISM = MONISMǳ (2015: 
21). How does the formula work? For Deleuze and Guattari being is, as we have seen, 
univocal and as such, there is not any being that comes first in the hierarchy Ȃ it is for that 
reason that Deleuze and Guattari prefer rhizomes over trees, the nomadic war-machine 
over state apparatuses. In other words, they reject a being that transcends the others, and 
thus this univocity expresses their commitment to monism. At the same time, though 
there is a pluralism because all beings are situated on a single plane Ȃ the plane of 
immanence as they call it. Hence, ǲall beings express the same plane of immanence 
differentlyǳ (Colebrook 2002: 32). 
Having seen how the two terms are manifested and explained within the Deleuzian 
corpus, we have to proceed by examining their relevance to the issue of human rights and 
the distinction that Deleuze made between ethics and morality. 
 
 
III. Ethics vs. Morality and the Future of Human Rights(?). 
 ǯ immanence, then, calls for a different ethics and this is the point where we 
can draw a preliminary schematic relation between his critique of human rights as 
transcendent universals and his thought more generally. We have stated previously that 
Deleuze argues that human rights reintroduce transcendence into philosophical thought. 
This, as we argue, happens through the medium of the introduction of a notion of 
morality, with Ȃ and despite its post-religious or even secular language Ȃ theological 
features. 
The above view echoes the views of multiple commentators referring to the ǲtriumph 
of rightsǳ (Douzinas 2000), the function of rights as ǲa paradigmǳ (Baxi 2008: 23), ǲrights 
as the [moral] measure for all timeǳ (Motha & Zartaloudis 2003: 243). Human rights are 
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by now forming a kind of ǲsecular theologyǳ (Fitzpatrick 2007). Hence, Deleuze opposes 
the notion of morality as a transcendent value Ȃ a notion that dictates ǲ
what is evilǳ, something that is detached from life and acts as a judge, which judges based ǲǳ of eternal values. This notion of transcendent human rights and 
their moral, eternal values have as a result the imposition of ǲconstraintsǳ upon any new 
possibilities of ethical living (Smith 2012: 146), of experimenting and creating. In his 
second book on Spinoza, Deleuze states that transcendent values and morality are all 
these things ǲthat are turned against lifeǳ (1988: 26). He continues by pointing out that it 
is through morality and transcendence that ǲlife is poisoned by categories of good and 
evil, of blame and merit, of sin and redemptionǳ (1988: 26). 
Ultimately, all the above have as a result to place us in a situation where we merely 
and blindly follow values, rules, and norms that are coming ǲfrom aboveǳ, without even 
evaluating why and if we have to follow such a transcendent moral code. Whoever or ǲǳǡǡ
an adversary of progress, even as evil or inhuman, and thus has to be fought and 
exterminated. Human rights are, thus, elevated to a divine status that supposedly holds 
the one, objective truth. It is in that way that the blind faith in rights and their values 
reduces us to vengeful spirits of ressentiment, wholly separated from life, placing us in a 
constantly judgmental mode of being and thinking Ȃ always in a negative manner, never 
creating. 
On the other hand, as we have already stated above, Deleuze supports immanent ethics 
as ǲa set of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of 
existing involvedǳ (Deleuze 1995: 100). In this way, Deleuze's account of immanence can 
be said to propose a type of ǲvitalismǳ (1995: 91), a philosophy of a life based on constant 
strife for creation, a philosophy that engages constantly in ǲinventing new possibilities of 
lifeǳ (Marks 1998: 1) Ȃ that is a life which is not reduced to static, fixed, pre-given or ǲǳ identities and values, but rather follows a rhizomatic mode of constant and 
creative change that always proceeds ǲfrom the middle, through the middle, coming and 
going rather than starting and finishingǳ (Deleuze & Guattari 2015: 27). 
Deleuze, in an interview about the work of Michel Foucault, states that both their 
philosophical thoughts are interested in ǲestablishing different ways of existing, 
depending on how you fold the line of forces, or inventing possibilities of life that depend 
on death too, on our relations to death: existing not as a subject but as a work of artǳ
(1995: 92). So we have to ask: Is such a way of thinking and acting through the medium 
of a different human rights mode of thought possible? In other words, can we think of an 
"immanent" account of rights based on ethics as opposed to morality, according to the 
distinction made by Deleuze? Can human rights accommodate the particularities and 
specificities of the singular cases we are faced with, or are they synonymous with a notion 
of transcendence that must be wholly overcome? Furthermore, if we respond to the 
previous question negatively and thus we are ready to concede that there is no future for 
an ethical or an immanent account of human rights then, we have to ask, what could be 
an alternative way of thinking beyond them?  
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This article may disappoint some people, in the sense that it neither aims to offer a 
definitive answer to the above question nor does it offer an alternative account of or for ǲǳ. Nonetheless, we consider it paramount that prior 
to any attempt to offer an alternative, we have to seriously attempt to identify the 
problem with the focus of our critique (in that case human rights). This is because we are 
at the point where it is difficult even to think that there is an alternative to human rights 
and to that extent to neoliberal policies in general. ǡǯ ? ?ǯ outcome 
has become our everyday reality. 
On the other hand, and despite not giving a definitive answer, we suggest that the 
above exploration and examination of the Deleuzian critique of rights and the ǯction between morality and ethics, possibly lead to a potentially new 
way of creative thinking and living in an ethical, expressive way that could do away from 
dogmas and hierarchies. Such a way of thinking and being, though, presupposes that we 
have to ta  ǲǳ     
experimentation does not guarantee absolute ends. Our, potentially, new inventive ways 
of living may lead to some peculiar results, and thus we have to be prepared to accept 
that we have to seriously revaluate human rights or any other values that are considered ǲǳ. Taking such a risk may cause an understandable uneasiness, but we are at 
a critical point where our "lack of experimentation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108) has 
led us to a nihilistic stalemate. Only through a radical revaluation of our transcendent, 
eternal values, do we have a potential Ȃ to paraphrase Antonin Artaud Ȃ to do away with 
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